Subject:
L10CL472 - URGENT Please put before judge - re: hearing on 15 Aug 2025 (Application to Set Aside Order dated 12 February 2025)
From:
Davy Thielens <51DP@davylondon.net>
Date:
08/08/2025, 10:45
To:
Jason Kallis <JKallis@meralibeedle.com>, "Morris, Diane" <diane.morris@justice.gov.uk>, "Central London County, Enquiries" <enquiries.centrallondon.countycourt@justice.gov.uk>


 Dear Sirs,



PLEASE PLACE  BEFORE A JUDGE ON RECEIPT - URGENT- RE HEARING ON 15 AUGUST 2025

 


We write further to Mr Kallis’s notes to the Court of 6 August and his third witness statement, served this morning, 7 August. He now states that he concedes the order of 12 February should be set aside, and asks the Court to extend the 15 August hearing to 1.5 hours and use it to dispose of the Claimants’ application for a vesting order

 

At the same time, four of the five pages of his witness statement argue that the conditions under CPR 39.3(5) are not met. The Claimants cannot have it both ways: argue the application is without merit, then “concede” it to avoid the financial consequences of having resisted it for three months. The 15 August hearing is listed to determine our set-aside application, and that is what we have prepared for, and will continue to prepare for, unless and until the Court sets the order aside.

 

We wrote to the Claimants repeatedly during set-aside preparations, asking for their position on our central point: that the vesting order is premature due to multiple unresolved terms of acquisition not agreed nor determined by the Tribunal. Mr Kallis’s latest statement typifies their response — a stream of allegations, unevidenced and irrelevant to the proceedings, designed to obscure the lack of substance. Not even an acknowledgement was offered. We still do not know their legal or factual position. Preparing for a substantive hearing under these conditions is near impossible.

 

This has been their approach throughout. Rather than engage with the substance or seek to resolve matters on the merits, the Claimants again resort to false and unsubstantiated claims — not to inform the Court, but to prejudice it, cast us in a bad light, and drive the case down a procedural route that suits them. Just take the increasingly outlandish, but very serious, claims concerning alleged drug offences, offered without any evidence — because none exists. We set out our full objections in an email to the Court on 18 June 2025 (see attached). They remain equally valid now.

 

We questioned the validity of Mr. Kallis first two submissions as evidence. Since then, Mr Kallis has confirmed that the police never shared any information about their visits to the property or any aspect of any investigation. This admission renders the 14 references to police actions, opinions, or conclusions about alleged drug activity nothing more than speculation and conjecture, all misleadingly phrased to give the impression of corroborated fact, when none exists. Still, Mr Kallis stands by every line and offers no correction.

 

In reality, the entire narrative rests on two isolated events: a 2022 raid when the flat was empty and forced entry was required, and a second police visit in April 2023, allegedly to arrest the tenant, but again, no proof or supporting evidence has ever been provided. Nothing has happened since April 2023: no incidents, no complaints, no reports of antisocial behaviour, making any renewed claim of urgency now wholly untenable.

 

The Claimants rely solely on their witness statements to support both theurgency and substance of their claims. We reject these statements as evidence. We have shown how Speculation is routinely framed as a confirmed fact. A quick read further reveals that the statements are not based on any first-hand knowledge by Mr Kallis, but on vague hearsay (“we are told”, “they have said”), often attributed to unnamed “clients” without a single specific source. Assertions are inaccurate, selective, or misleading; yet presented as fact under a statement of truth, relying entirely on the credibility of Mr Kallis as an officer of the Court. However embellished, they remain hearsay originating almost exclusively from one of his clients, who has a documented, personal campaign against the tenant of Flat 2. These statements have shed all credibility. They are advocacy, not evidence — and should be treated as such.

 

We repeat this point deliberately: the aim of these tactics is not to prove a case, but to provoke prejudice and press the Court into premature action. We have not yet had any opportunity to respond to these allegations, plead a defence, or file evidence for a substantive hearing. To treat the matter as suitable for summary disposal under Part 8 would entrench that procedural unfairness. There are clear and unresolved disputes of fact. The matter belongs on the Part 7 track.

 

As to costs, the Claimants’ position is unsustainable. The prematurity of the vesting order has long been raised, with reference to binding case law. We identified unresolved terms, sought engagement, and were ignored. Their solicitor knew the February hearing was procedurally flawed and that a set-aside was inevitable; a point we raised as soon as we saw the Order in April. Yet they waited until days before the hearing to concede, wasting time and resources. Objections based on tone or our unrepresented status are irrelevant. The application was necessary and well-founded. The costs fall to them.

 

 

We will file a further witness statement by tomorrow addressing the Claimants’ allegations and evidentiary gaps.

 

Yours faithfully,

 

Davy Thielens

on behalf of Tarquin Management Ltd